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Abstract. There is a large body of research in economics and law suggesting that the 
legal origins of a country—that is, whether its legal regime is based on English common 
law or French, German, or Nordic civil law—profoundly impacts a range of outcomes. 
However, the exact relationship between legal origins and legal substance has been 
disputed in the literature, and not fully explored with nuanced legal coding. We revisit 
this debate while leveraging novel cross-country datasets that provide detailed coding 
of two areas of laws: property and antitrust. We find that having shared legal origins 
strongly predicts whether countries have similar property regimes, but does little to 
predict whether countries have similar antitrust regimes. Our results suggest that legal 
origins may be an important predictor of legal substance in well-established legal 
regimes, but do little to explain substantive variation in more recent areas of law.  
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Most countries’ legal systems can be traced to a handful of models, such as 
English common law or French civil law.1 An extensive body of research in economics 
and law suggests that the legal model a country follows—known as its “legal origins”—
has profound long-run effects on a number of economic, political, and social 
outcomes. These outcomes range from growth in GDP per capita (Mahoney 2001), to 
use of military conscription (Mulligan and Shleifer 2005a; 2005b), to transmission rates 
of HIV (Anderson 2018), to climate change policies (Fredriksson and Wollscheid 
2015), to criminal incarceration (D’Amico and Williamson 2015), and to judicial 
decisions (Zhang, Liu, and Garoupa 2018).  
The start of the so-called “legal origins” literature is widely credited to four 
scholars—Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andre Shleifer, and Robert 
Vishny—jointly known as “LLSV” (La Porta et al. 1997; 1998). LLSV studied cross-
country differences in financial development and documented significant variance in 
the legal protections that different countries afford to investors. According to LLSV, 
much of this variance can be traced to countries’ legal origins, with common law 
countries providing more extensive investor protections than civil law countries. This 
relationship led La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008: 326) to conclude that 
“legal rules and regulations differ systematically across countries . . . these differences 
in legal rules and regulations are accounted for to a significant extent by legal origins.”  
LLSV’s research launched an influential literature examining the significance of 
legal origins (Mahoney 2001; Dam 2006; Roe 2006; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer 2008; Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila 2017). This research has shown that legal 
origins are correlated with aspects of countries’ legal systems like property rights and 
                                               
1 On the controversies concerning legal families’ taxonomy, see Pargendler (2012). 





judicial independence, and that those differences are in turn correlated with greater 
economic growth (Anderson 2018: 1411). But this literature has also been highly 
contested in academic debates. For instance, it has been criticized for ignoring 
systematic differences between countries that predate their legal origins (Klerman et al. 
2011), and for failing to document the mechanisms through which legal origins impact 
contemporary outcomes (Bazzi and Clemens 2013).2  
This literature has also been critiqued for possibly overstating the extent to 
which countries that share legal origins actually have similar substantive laws. Most 
notably, in their prominent initial study, LLSV’s data suggest that legal origins predict 
the legal protections provided to investors (La Porta et al. 1998), implying that 
countries with similar legal origins were likely to offer similar legal protections. 
However, subsequent research demonstrated that the link between countries’ legal 
origins and their investor protections can be attributed to errors in LLSV’s coding of 
countries’ laws (Spamann 2009a). Once these errors were corrected, the correlation 
between countries’ legal origins and their investor protections disappeared. This finding 
calls into question the link between legal origins and legal substance, undermining a key 
contribution of the legal origins literature. And because detailed cross-country coding 
of most areas of law does not exist,3 the relationship between legal origins and legal 
substance has not been adequately explored to date.  
                                               
2 There are, of  course, examples of  research that takes steps to avoid these concerns. For instance, Oto-
Peralías and Romero-Ávila (2014) traced the link between endowments and current legal outcomes within 
the English common legal family through the colonial legal-administrative apparatus. The measure of  the 
extent of  indirect rule in each colony was constructed as the ratio of  colonially recognized customary court 
cases over the total number of  court cases in 1955, with the latter comprising both customary court cases 
heard by native chiefs and magistrate court cases handled by British officials. 
3 Corporate law is an exception. See the extensive literature in the field, e.g., Armour et al. (2009a), Armour 
et al. (2009b), Jackson and Roe (2009), Roe (2006), La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2013), La Porta 
et al. (1998), Spamann (2009a). 





Moreover, even if legal origins once predicted the substantive legal rules that 
countries adopted, it is not obvious that this influence persists today. For example, 
early in their history, common law countries may have primarily looked to other 
common law countries when drafting their laws. But today, those same countries may 
instead look to a country that is a leading regulator in a given area of law as their model, 
regardless of whether that country had the same legal origins. Moreover, countries may 
now model their legal rules on the ones adopted or recommended by international or 
regional organizes, such as the European Union, instead of emulating countries with 
shared legal origins or histories. If this is correct, legal origins may not explain variation 
in laws that countries have adopted more recently.  
This article provides a more comprehensive assessment of the relationship 
between legal origins and legal substance than what exists to date. We are able to do 
this because of two new comparative datasets that provide detailed coding of 
substantive legal regimes around the world: one dataset documents countries’ property 
laws and the other dataset documents countries’ antitrust laws. To the best of our 
knowledge, with the exception of datasets that code national constitutions, these 
datasets are the largest cross-country efforts to code entire bodies of law. These 
datasets thus allow us to assess the relationship between legal origins and legal 
substance with more nuance than prior research. Moreover, these datasets offer the 
practical advantage of covering one older area of regulation (property) and one newer 
area of regulation (antitrust); and because, unlike LLSV and related research, both 
datasets were coded for projects unrelated to the study of legal origins, it is less likely 
that any errors in their coding correlate with countries’ legal origins.  
We also use a method that we believe is novel to studying the relationship 
between legal origins and legal substance. Prior research projects have aggregated 





relevant variables to create indexes of aspects of countries’ legal systems,4 and then 
assessed whether legal origins are correlated with higher or lower scores on these 
indexes. The shortcoming with this aggregated variable approach, however, is that 
countries may have similar index scores despite having dissimilar underlying laws. In 
contrast, we borrow a method previously used to study legal diffusion (Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Melton 2008; Law and Versteeg 2012; Bradford et al. 2019a) and use 
country pairs as our unit of observation. We calculate the correlation between each pair 
of countries’ property regimes and the correlation between the same pair of countries’ 
antitrust regimes. We then regress the correlations of property law and antitrust law 
against a dummy variable for whether a country pair has the same legal origin.  
Across a range of regression specifications, our empirical analysis shows that 
having the same legal origins is strongly associated with more similar property laws, but 
it has no clear association with countries’ antitrust law. This finding suggests that legal 
origins may have been a powerful determinant of a country’s substantive laws in some 
areas, but the influence of legal origins may have waned in other areas. We offer 
suggestive evidence that this result is explained, at least in part, by alternative influences 
that have shaped a country’s antitrust laws more than its shared legal origins or colonial 
history—a trend that is absent in property law.  
 
2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. The Legal Origins Literature  
Scholars have long documented how countries’ legal systems are largely based 
on common law or civil law models initially developed in Europe (David and Brierley 
1985; Glendon, Gordon, and Osakwe 1994; Zweigert and Kötz 1998; Garoupa and 
                                               
4 For example, La Porta et al. (1997; 1998) created an index of  countries’ legal protections provided to 
investors, or Botero et al. (2004) created an index of  countries’ legal protections afforded to workers. 





Pargendler 2014). These legal models were then transmitted around the world through 
mechanisms like conquest, colonization, and commerce. As a result of this diffusion, 
although countries’ laws are heterogenous in a myriad of ways, their legal systems can 
be grouped into a handful of categories based on their original model.5 These groups 
have alternatively been described as legal origins, legal traditions, and legal families. 
In the 1990s, an influential line of research began to examine the link between 
countries’ legal origins and their contemporary economic outcomes. This research 
began with two seminal articles from LLSV: La Porta et al. (1997) and La Porta et al. 
(1998). These papers documented a link between countries’ legal origins and the 
substantive legal protections they provide to investors, and then further argued that 
stronger investor protections are associated with greater financial development. LLSV’s 
finding that legal origins explain much of the variation in countries’ economic 
performance led to an explosion of research. This research generally followed LLSV: 
demonstrate the link between legal origins and cross-country legal differences, and then 
show how those legal differences are associated with important outcomes.  
In a review of this literature, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) 
argued that the research on legal origins could be broken into three categories.6 The 
first category of research directly follows LLSV by examining the relationship between 
legal origins and some aspect of investor protection, corporate law, or contract 
enforcement (e.g. La Porta et al. 1999; 2000; 2002; Dyck and Zingales 2004; Djankov, 
McLiesh, and Ramalho 2006; La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006; Djankov, 
                                               
5 The way to divide these groups is contested. For example, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) 
divides countries into four groups, Klerman et al. (2011) divide countries into six groups, and Chang, 
Garoupa, and Wells (2020) argue that countries can be divided into any number of  groups.  
6 This literature has continued to develop since La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer reviewed it in 2008, 
yet these broad categories of  research lines remain broadly consistent. For more recent surveys of  the legal 
origins literature, see Spamann (2015: 135–137) and Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila (2017). 





McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007; Djankov et al. 2008a; Djankov et al. 2008b; Spamann 
2010). The second category of research documents the link between legal origins and 
government regulation of economic activity and markets (Djankov et al. 2002; Djankov 
et al. 2003b; Botero et al. 2004; Mulligan and Shleifer 2005b; 2005a). The third category 
of research investigates the relationship between legal origins and features of the 
judiciary (e.g. Djankov et al. 2003a; La Porta et al. 2004; Djankov et al. 2008b). 
Although there are differences in the methods and data used by these categories of 
research, they have all largely found that common law legal systems are associated with 
more secure property rights, greater levels of judicial independence, and superior 
financial development. 
 
2.2. The Link Between Legal Origins and Legal Substance  
In addition to being widely influential, this literature has also been widely 
criticized (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2003a; 2003b; Rajan and Zingales 2003; 
Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz 2005; Roe 2006; Klerman and Mahoney 2007; Roe 
and Siegel 2009; Spamann 2009a; 2010; Bazzi and Clemens 2013). One line of criticism 
has argued that cross-country differences in economic outcomes are better explained 
by factors other than legal origins. For example, former British colonies were wealthier 
than former French colonies at the time of colonization, and thus it is unsurprising that 
they are wealthier today (Klerman et al. 2011). Another line of criticism notes that 
countries with the same colonial or legal histories are likely to be similar along a range 
of social, political, and legal dimensions, which makes it nearly impossible to reliably 
trace the relationship between legal origins and contemporary outcomes through a 
specific mechanism (Bazzi and Clemens 2013).  
The line of criticism that is relevant to our project has questioned the link 
between legal origins and legal substance. Most notably, Spamann (2009a) corrected 





inaccuracies in the data used by La Porta et al. (1997; 1998) to measure investor 
protection. When using the corrected data, Spamann (2009a) no longer found that 
countries with common law legal origins had stronger legal protections. Relatedly, 
Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2005) reexamined the link between legal origins 
and legal substance while accounting for cross-country cultural differences, and 
concluded that the variation in legal regimes between countries with different legal 
origins may be overstated.  
Moreover, the existing literature has done little to explore whether the link 
between legal origins and legal substance has continued even while new patterns of 
legal diffusion have emerged.7 Although colonization may have previously been a 
primary method of legal diffusion, other forms of legal diffusion have subsequently 
developed (Linos 2011; 2013; Gadinis 2015). For instance, institutions like the 
European Union, OECD, and World Bank have urged countries, regardless of their 
legal origins, to adopt certain legal regimes based on “best practices” in a wide range 
of policy areas (Bradford 2020). In fact, in the 1990s, La Porta et al. (1998: 1119) 
recognized that these alternative patterns of diffusion may have greater influence over 
corporate law going forward. The current link between legal origins and legal substance 
may thus be more tenuous than earlier research suggests. 
 
2.3. Our Approach 
Our goal is to conduct a more nuanced study of the relationship between legal 
origins and legal substance than has previously been done. To do so, we examine the 
correlations between legal origins and the substance of countries’ property laws and 
antitrust laws. We focus on these two areas because a detailed coding of countries’ laws 
                                               
7 But see Spamann (2009b), who observed that at least in some fields, legal diffusion has tracked legal origins. 





in these domains has recently been completed. To our knowledge, along with projects 
that have coded national constitutions (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2009; Law and 
Versteeg 2012; 2013; Ginsburg and Versteeg 2014; Gutmann, Hayo, and Voigt 2014), 
these are the most detailed datasets available in comparative law.8  
Focusing on these areas of law provides two practical advantages. First, 
property is one of the first areas of law that countries adopt, often shortly after their 
modern legal systems have been established. In contrast, although a handful of 
countries adopted antitrust regimes prior to World War II, most antitrust laws were 
adopted after 1990 (Bradford et al. 2019b). This variance allows us to test one area of 
law with old roots and another area of law with new roots. Second, these datasets were 
coded for projects unrelated to the study of legal origins. Thus, any coding errors are 
unlikely to be correlated with countries’ legal origins because of any subjective bias, 
conscious or not, of the researchers.  
In addition to using new data, our research design is also different than prior 
efforts to explore the link between legal origins and legal substance. Prior research has 
used the country as the unit of analysis and created indexes to represent countries’ legal 
substance (e.g. Oto-Peralías and Romero-Ávila 2014). Although creating an index is a 
reasonable and standard way to measure legal systems, there are several drawbacks to 
using them to measure the similarity of legal regimes across countries. For one, it is 
possible that countries have the same scores on an index while having dissimilar legal 
regimes.9 For another, indexes are often created using just a handful of variables, and 
these variables may not therefore capture the intricacies of a country’s legal regime.  
                                               
8 As Spamann (2009c: 798) points out, large-sample, quantitative comparative law research projects often 
rely on a narrow set of  information for each country. Our study is an exception. 
9 To illustrate this point, imagine an index comprised of  four binary variables (A, B, C, and D) that are added 
together to create an index. If  Country X has provisions A and B coded as 1, they may receive a score of  2 
out of  4 on the index. But if  Country Y has provisions C and D coded as 1, they may also receive a score 
 





Instead of looking at individual countries while using a single index of countries’ 
property laws or antitrust laws, our unit of observation is pairs of countries. By looking 
at pairs of countries, we can examine the correlation in their laws across a large number 
of distinct variables. This approach has the advantage of directly assessing how similar 
legal provisions are across countries that have shared legal origins. In other words, our 
research design measures whether countries with shared legal origins are more likely to 
have highly correlated property or antitrust regimes.    
 
3. DATA 
3.1. Legal Substance Data 
Our property law data was introduced in Chang, Garoupa, and Wells (2020). 
This dataset contains more than 250 variables on the contents of property law in 156 
jurisdictions based on laws in 2015. Most of the jurisdictions in the dataset are 
countries, but some of them are sub-national jurisdictions that have their own property 
law, such as Hong Kong, Macau, and Scotland. As property laws are not always enacted 
at the national level, in some cases the data uses certain sub-national jurisdictions to 
stand for the whole nation.10 The authors selected 108 key variables and transformed 
them into 170 dummy variables to construe property legal families. The dummy 
variables include, for instance, whether a country allows adverse possession of 
landownership and whether a country explicitly stipulates the numerus clausus principle. 
For our analysis, we use the same 170 variables.  
                                               
of  2 out of  4 on the index despite having made entirely different substantive legal choices. 
10 For instance, New York property law is used as a proxy for U.S. property law (which is a reasonable choice, 
given that Chang, Garoupa, and Wells (2020) find that it strongly correlates with California property law). In 
addition, England and Wales property law is used as a proxy for U.K. property law, Ontario property law is 
used as a proxy for Canadian property law, and China’s 2018 draft civil code, which is almost the same as the 
civil code eventually passed in May 2020, is used as a proxy for Chinese property law, disregarding Hong 
Kong’s and Macau’s different property laws. 





Our antitrust law data is from the Comparative Competition Law Dataset 
introduced by Bradford et al. (2019b). This dataset consists of detailed coding of 
antitrust law provisions from 130 jurisdictions—125 countries and 5 regional 
organizations—from the beginning of modern antitrust law until 2010. Because many 
jurisdictions have multiple relevant laws, the dataset contains the coding of 700 
individual laws in total. For each law, the data codes a number of substantive variables 
regarding merger review, the regulation of anti-competitive agreements, and the abuse 
of dominance. The dataset also includes variables that capture the institutional design 
of the antitrust regime, including whether the law recognizes a private right of action, 
the possibility of fines, or imprisonment as a remedy. Importantly, the dataset contains 
the coding of the “antitrust law regime” in force in any given year, which means that it 
layers together all the old and new laws in force in any given year to capture the entire 
set of antitrust laws in force each year. For our analysis, we use the 91 dummy variables 
in the dataset that measure the substance of countries’ antitrust regimes.  
Figure 1 maps the coverage of our property and antitrust data. In total, we have 
both property and antitrust data for 91 countries. As Figure 1 shows, the datasets 
include observations from all regions of the world, and the countries for which both 
datasets are available include the world’s leading economies. Following the LLSV 
tradition, our analysis weights all countries equally, regardless of their relative wealth, 
population, or political importance.  
 
3.2. Legal Origins Data 
Our primary coding of countries’ legal origins is based on data from LLSV (we 
also use three alternative measures of legal origins in Section 4.4).11 The LLSV dataset 
                                               
11  We acquired the data from the personal website of  Andrei Shleifer (the S in LLSV), 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/data_2.zip. The zip file contains two spreadsheets. We used 
 





breaks countries into four categories. It first codes countries as either having common 
law or civil law legal traditions. Then, countries with civil law traditions are further 
broken into one of three traditions: French, German, or Nordic. Even if countries 
incorporate influences from other legal traditions over time, the LLSV data still codes 
countries based on the initial legal origin. 
 
Figure 2 presents countries’ legal origins using the LLSV coding. As  
Figure 2 shows, many countries are of French legal origin; countries with 
German legal origin cluster in central Europe and East Asia; and Africa is a tug-of-war 
among these two legal origins and English common law. Of the 91 countries in our 
sample, there are 13 countries with common law legal origins, 57 countries with French 
civil law legal origins, 17 with German civil law legal origins, and 4 with Nordic civil 
law legal origins.  
 
3.3. Dataset Construction 
Because our goal is to test whether countries with shared legal origins have 
similar substantive legal regimes, our unit of analysis is pairs of countries. Or, as they 
are referred to in the international relations literature, country “dyads.” To ensure that 
differences in data availability do not drive our results, we restricted our sample to 
dyads for which we have data on countries’ property laws, antitrust laws, and legal 
origins. This results in a sample of 4,095 dyads comprised of 91 unique countries 
(91*90/2 = 4, 095). Part 1 of the online appendix lists the countries in our dataset. 
For each dyad, we created a measure of the similarity of their property laws and 
antitrust laws by calculating the Pearson’s phi, which is a correlation coefficient for 
                                               
the “legor07” variable in “Legal_origins_JEL2008.dta.” Regarding the “legor07” variable, English Common 
law is 1; French civil law is 2; German civil law is 4; Nordic law is 5.  





binary variables, for all of the variables in each dataset. We used this measure of 
similarity because its scale from -1 (indicating perfectly opposite coding) to +1 
(indicating perfectly identical coding) provides an intuitive interpretation, and because 
it is a method that has already been used to study the similarity of legal regimes (Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Melton 2008; Law and Versteeg 2012; Bradford et al. 2019a).12 For 
instance, for the Albania–Vietnam dyad, we calculated the correlation between 
Albania’s coding for the 170 property variables and Vietnam’s coding for those 
variables. They had the same coding for 121 of 170 variables, which resulted in a 
correlation of 0.45. We similarly calculated the correlation of each dyad’s antitrust laws 
based on 91 variables in our dataset. Albania and Vietnam had the same coding for 71 
of 91 variables, which resulted in a correlation of 0.57.  
For each dyad, we also created a variable to indicate whether the two countries 
had a “shared legal origin.” To do so, we coded countries as having a shared legal origin 
if both countries in the dyad were coded as belonging to the same legal origins as 
categorized by LLSV. For instance, we coded Australia–Canada as having shared legal 
origins because LLSV categorized both as having English Common Law origin, and 
we coded Algeria–Ivory Coast as having a shared legal origin because LLSV categorized 
both as having French Civil Law origin. In total, 44.4 percent of the dyads (1,816 out 
of 4,095) have a shared legal origin.  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our dyad-level dataset. In addition to 
the variables mentioned above, Table 1 also reports summary statistics for six control 
variables we use in some regression specifications. Four of these control variables are 
                                               
12 Section 4.5 uses an alternative measure of  similarity based on percentage of  variables for which the 
countries in a dyad have the same coding.  
 





measured at the dyad level: 13  Distance, 14  Contiguity, 15  Common National 
Language,16 and Common Ethnic Language.17 The other two control variables are 
measured at the country level: Population and Nominal GDP (we use the natural log 
of these variables because they are both right screwed and it is likely that the ratio of 
these variables is relevant to the relationships we are testing).18  
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Graphical Evidence 
Figure 3 graphs the correlations of dyads’ substantive laws broken out by 
whether they have shared legal origins. Panel A graphs the distribution of dyads’ 
correlations for property law and Panel B graphs the distribution of dyads’ correlations 
for antitrust law. The x-axis is the correlation coefficient between two dyads’ 
substantive law variables and the y-axis is the percent of dyads that have a given 
correlation. The distribution for dyads that have shared legal origins are shown 
separately from the dyads that do not share the same legal origin.  
Three results from Figure 3 are worth highlighting. First, almost all dyads have 
positive correlations for both areas of law. Just 0.8 percent of dyads (31 out of 4,095) 
have property laws that are negatively correlated. These include several dyads with no 
obvious connections, like Pakistan–Portugal and Madagascar–Taiwan. Moreover, just 
0.07 percent of dyads (3 out of 4,095) have antitrust laws that are negatively correlated. 
These three dyads are Qatar–Tajikistan, Bolivia–South Africa, and Tajikistan–Kuwait.  
                                               
13 These variables are from the “dist_cepii.dta” dataset mentioned above.  
14 This variable codes the population-weighted distance (in kilometers) between the two countries. 
15 This variable codes if  the two countries have contiguous borders. 
16 This variable codes if  both countries have the same official primary language. 
17 This variable codes if  the same language is spoken by at least 9% of  the population in both countries. 
18  These variables are from “gravdata.dta” downloaded from the Gravity section on CEPII website, 
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/download.asp?id=8.  





Second, the correlations are lower on average for property law than for antitrust 
law. For property law, dyads have a mean correlation of 0.30 and a median correlation 
of 0.29. For antitrust law, dyads have a mean correlation of 0.43 and a median 
correlation of 0.43. This difference is notable given the distribution of correlations for 
both types of law. To illustrate, only 18 percent of dyads have a correlation above 0.43 
for property law (which is the median for antitrust law). The higher correlations for 
antitrust are likely because most countries with antitrust laws only adopted them in the 
last few decades, and when they did adopt them, they followed models from the 
European Union and the United States (Bradford et al. 2019a). 
Third, having a shared legal origin is associated with higher correlations for 
property law, but it is not associated with higher correlations for antitrust law. More 
specifically, for property law, dyads without a shared legal origin have a mean 
correlation of 0.27 and dyads with a shared legal origin have a mean correlation of 0.34. 
For antitrust law, however, dyads without a shared legal origin have a mean correlation 
of 0.43 and dyads with a shared legal origin also have a mean correlation of 0.43.  
 
4.2. Empirical Specification 
To more formally test the relationship between shared legal origins and similar 
substance of laws, we estimate Equation 1:  
ajt = α + SLOjt β0 + ζ´jtβ1 + c´jβ2 + c´t β3 + φj + ηt +εjt   (1) 
for dyadjt. The dependent variable ajt is one of two measures of the similarity between 
legal regimes: the correlation coefficient between a dyad’s property laws or the 
correlation coefficient between a dyad’s antitrust laws. The key independent variable 
SLOjt codes whether both countries in a given dyad have a shared legal origin. For 
example, SLOjt is coded as 1 if both countries in a dyad have English Common Law 
legal origins, but coded as 0 if one country’s legal origin is English Common Law while 





the legal origin of the other country in the dyad is French Civil Law. In addition, ζ´ 
represents control variables measured for dyadjt, c´ represents control variables that 
are measured separately for country j and for country t in dyadjt, φj represents fixed 
effects for country j and ηt represents fixed effects for country t,19 and εjt is the error 
term. Because the errors for a given country are likely to be correlated for all the dyads 
that the country is part of, we use multi-way clustering to cluster our standard errors 
for both country j and country t. 
It is important to note that it would be inappropriate to control for most 
variables that may influence the correlations between dyads’ property or antitrust laws. 
This is because legal origins have been linked to a range of outcomes that occur after 
countries acquire a given legal origin (Bazzi and Clemens 2013), and many natural 
control variables are thus likely to have been influenced by a country’s legal origin. 
Therefore, controlling for factors like economic growth, political regimes, or 
membership in international institutions would be, in the words of Angrist and Pischke 
(2008), “bad controls”—or, in the language of political science, would introduce “post-
treatment bias.” We thus only use a minimal set of control variables in our regressions.  
 
4.3. Primary Results 
Tables 2 and 3 report the results estimating Equation 1 for property law and 
antitrust law, respectively. Column 1 simply includes the shared legal origin variable, 
Column 2 adds fixed effects for country j and country t in each dyad,20 and Column 3 
                                               
19 Because we only have one observation per dyad, we are unable to include fixed effects for combinations 
of  states. Instead, the country fixed effects we include pick up any unobserved heterogeneity for all the dyads 
of  which a given country is a member. That said, one concern with this approach is that a given country can 
be country j in some dyads and country t in some dyads. The result is that the fixed effect for a given country 
may be different for dyads that the country is indexed as country j than dyads where the country is indexed 
as country t. In Part 2 of  the online appendix, we address this concern by developing a leave-out measure 
of  all of  a countries’ other correlations (regardless whether the country was indexed as country j or country 
t in a given dyad) that we control for as an alternative to fixed effects.  
20  F-test of  the joint significance of  the fixed effects allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the 
 





adds controls for the distance and contiguous borders between countries. Column 3 is 
our preferred specification because it does not include any variables likely to have been 
influenced by countries’ shared legal origins (that is, it does not include any “bad 
controls”). For illustrative purposes, although these additional variables may be 
influenced by having a shared legal origin, in Column 4 we add controls for whether 
dyads have common national and ethnic languages, and in Column 5 we add controls 
for each country in a given dyad’s population and nominal GDP.  
The results in Table 2 shows that having a shared legal origin is consistently 
associated with dyads having property laws that are more highly correlated. Not only 
are the estimates for all five specifications highly statistically significant (p < 0.001), the 
size of the effect is substantively large. Our preferred specification, Column 3, suggests 
that having a shared legal origin is associated with having a 0.09 higher correlation for 
property laws. To put this effect in perspective, this standard deviation for Property 
Law Correlation is 0.14, which means that having a shared legal origin has a roughly 
0.6 standard deviation effect. Or, in other words, an increase of 0.09 would move a 
median dyad to being roughly a 75th percentile dyad in Property Law Correlation.  
The results in Table 3 show that having a shared legal origin is associated with 
at most slightly higher correlations for antitrust laws. Although the estimates are 
statistically significant for several of the specifications, the size of the coefficient for 
our key independent variable is consistently small. In our preferred specification, 
Column 3, the coefficient for shared legal origin is 0.01. However, the standard 
deviation for Antitrust Law Correlation is 0.13, suggesting that having shared legal 
                                               
coefficients for the fixed effects are zero (in other words, including the fixed effects increases the explanatory 
power of  our regressions). 





origins is associated with roughly a 0.1 standard deviation higher correlation. Using 
standard rules of thumb (Cohen 1988), this effect is negligible. 
 
4.4. Alternative Measures of Legal Origin 
Our primary results code countries’ legal origins using data from LLSV (2008). 
There are, however, several alternative ways to measure legal origins. We specifically 
test the robustness of our results when using three of these alternative approaches.  
First, we use an alternative measure of legal origins produced by Klerman et al. 
(2011) (“KMSW”). The KMSW data added the categories of “mixed” and “Islamic” to 
the four legal traditions used by LLSV. For instance, the KMSW coding recategorizes 
Israel from common law to mixed and Qatar from French Civil Law to Islamic. 
Additionally, the KMSW data corrected a number of mistakes in the LLSV coding.  
Second, we use a measure of colonial origins that was also produced by 
KMSW.21 Most countries have legal origins based on their colonial relationships, but 
for some countries legal origins and colonial origins are not the same. For instance, 
some countries with French legal origins were colonized by countries like Belgium, 
Italy, and the Netherlands, and some countries that were British colonies drew legal 
traditions from multiple countries (e.g. South Africa). KMSW coded countries as 
having one of six colonial origins: former English colonies; former French colonies; 
former colonies of other French civil law countries; colonies that were part of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire; other former colonies; and countries never colonized.22  
                                               
21 We acquired the data from Journal of  Legal Analysis, which published Klerman et al. (2011). The data is 
available at: https://academic.oup.com/jla/article/3/2/379/899816#supplementary-data. The zip file 
includes “Klerman_etal_LO_v_CO.dta.” We use the “LO” variable, which is KMSW’s coding of  legal origins, 
and the “CO” variable, which is their coding of  colonial power. 
22 When country-level data is transformed into dyads, simply treating two countries both of  which are “Not 
Colonized” as having the same colonial history creates bias. Thus, a dummy variable Both Not Colonized 
(coded as 1 if  neither country in a pair have been colonized) is included in these regressions. 
 





Third, we also coded whether countries have shared legal orders. KMSW do 
not always code countries’ exact colonizer. Rather, some colonial powers are grouped 
as Other French Civil Law or Other. Wimmer and Min (2006) document colonial 
powers in all territories since 1816,23 and thus provide more exact information on 
colonial histories. Using this data, we coded countries as having shared legal orders if 
they either had a colonial relationship—e.g., the United Kingdom and India—or if 
both countries were both colonies of the same country—for e.g., India and Australia. 
Figure 4 plots the coefficients of interest when using these alternative 
approaches to coding legal origins (for comparison, Figure 4 also plots the coefficients 
of interest from Tables 2 and 3).24 Separate lines plot the five regression specifications 
initially introduced in Tables 2 and 3. For each group of five lines, the top line is the 
coefficient from column 1, the bottom five lines is the coefficient from column 5, and 
our preferred specification from column 3 is shown in black.  
The results in Figure 4 show that these alternative ways of measuring shared 
legal origins produce results that are similar to our primary ones. The coefficients for 
property law are almost all positive, statistically significant, and substantively large. In 
contrast, the coefficients for antitrust law are mostly close to zero and frequently 
statistically insignificant. In addition to illustrating that our primary results are not 
sensitive to the measure of shared legal origins we use, Figure 4 also makes it clear that 
it is difficult to know which measure of shared legal origins—for instance, legal origins 
or colonial histories—has a stronger association with countries’ substantive property 
                                               
23  The data are available for downloading at Andreas Wimmer’s website: 
http://www.columbia.edu/~aw2951/, under “FROM EMPIRE TO NATION-STATE (REPLICATION 
DATA) Territorial Data, 1816-2001.” The “imppower” variable identifies the imperial power at a territory. 
An easier to use dataset can be downloaded from: https://github.com/owid/owid-
datasets/blob/master/datasets/Colonial%20Regimes%20%20Minner%20and%20Wim%20(2006)/Coloni
al%20Regimes%20-%20Minner%20and%20Wim%20(2006).csv. 
24 Part 3 of  the online appendix reports the full results of  these regressions.  





law or antitrust laws. This is because the confidence intervals are largely overlapping 
for the alternative specifications. As a result, we cannot say with confidence whether 
countries with shared legal origins, shared colonial histories, or shared legal orders are 
more likely to have similar substantive legal regimes in property and antitrust law.  
 
4.5 Robustness 
Our primary results are robust to a range of alternative modeling choices and 
specifications. Because these results are consistent with our main findings, this 
discussion is brief and the results are only reported in the online appendix.25 First, 
other research has calculated the similarity of legal regimes based on the percent of 
variables that are coded the same instead of the correlations across variables (Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Melton 2009). Our results are robust to using this alternative approach. 
Second, our primary results aggregate all types of shared legal origins together even 
though there may be heterogenous effects based on the type of legal origin. But our 
results are robust when we include separate dummy variables for different types of 
shared legal origins. In the online appendix, we also separately report the average 
correlations for all ten possible combinations of legal origins. When disaggregating the 
data in this way, the patterns are consistent with our overall results. Third, EU member 
states, regardless of their legal origins, have adopted similar antitrust regimes, which 
may be negatively influence the overall relationship between shared legal origins and 
antitrust laws. But our results remain consistent even when we exclude either the 28 
EU members or all European countries. Fourth, for consistency with our property 
data, we used all 91 substantive variables in our antitrust data when measuring the 
similarity of countries’ antitrust regimes, but our results are robust to only using the 
                                               
25 Part 4 of  the online appendix reports these results.  





variables that have been identified by prior research as the most substantively important 
(Bradford et al. 2019a).  
 
5. DISCUSSION 
Our results suggest that common legal origins predict the similarity in countries’ 
property laws, but they do little to predict similarity in antitrust laws. For example, the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand, which share legal origins, have a 0.17 correlation 
in their antitrust laws, while United Kingdom and France, which do not share legal 
origins, have a 0.27 correlation in their antitrust law. Similarly, the correlation in 
antitrust law between Ireland and US (0.53) is lower than that between Ireland and 
Estonia (0.68), even though the former share legal origins while the latter do not.  
While the European examples may be attributed to the direct influence of the 
EU, there is a similar phenomenon in Asia. Common-law countries like India, Malaysia, 
Pakistan, and Singapore have antitrust laws are not highly correlated with the United 
Kingdom (0.31, 0.37, 0.21, and 0.28, respectively). Instead, their antitrust laws are more 
closely aligned with countries in the civil law legal families. For instance, these four 
countries’ antitrust law correlations with Taiwan, a member of the German Civil Law 
family, are all higher than their correlations with the United Kingdom (0.48, 0.39, 0.43, 
and 0.35, respectively). Across these examples, the property laws in those common-law 
countries remain similar to their common-law peers. 
There are also a few examples where legal origins would predict certain 
countries’ antitrust laws to follow French or German legal tradition but where these 
countries have followed a different path. For example, antitrust laws of Bolivia (0.20 
with France; 0.41 with the US), Japan (0.37 with Germany; 0.69 with the US), Peru 
(0.39 with France; 0.51 with the US), and Panama (0.49 with France; 0.62 with the US) 





correlate more closely with countries associated with the common law tradition despite 
their French and German legal origins. 
Of course, there are examples where shared legal origins correlate with both 
property and antitrust laws: France and Belgium have a 0.71 correlation for property 
law and a 0.62 correlation for antitrust law, and South Korea and Taiwan have a 0.72 
correlation for property law and a 0.65 correlation for antitrust law. There are also 
examples of low correlations across both property law and antitrust law when the dyads 
do not share a legal origin: Australia and China have a 0.20 correlation for property law 
and a 0.18 correlation for antitrust law, and Israel and Indonesia have a 0.16 correlation 
for property law and a 0.19 correlation for antitrust law.  
But, in general, countries with shared legal origins are not more likely to have 
similar antitrust regimes than countries without shared legal origins. This is likely for 
several reasons. For one, countries’ antitrust laws have been shaped through regulators’ 
and policy makers’ engagement in various international organizations and trans-
governmental networks. A specialized network of antitrust regulators—the 
International Competition Network (ICN)—has been particularly influential, but more 
general bodies—like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD)—have fostered global antitrust convergence through the promotion of 
international best practices (Tritell and Kraus 2018). 
Another important factor is that antitrust laws are largely a more recent 
phenomenon, with most countries adopting them after 1990 (Bradford and Chilton 
2019). By that time, these countries had many models to emulate. The EU in particular 
offered an attractive template to emulate given the specific and detailed nature of EU 
antitrust laws, as well as their availability in many languages (Bradford et al. 2019b). 





The EU’s active push to export its antitrust laws through trade agreements, and extend 
regulatory cooperation and technical assistance for new antitrust regimes likely further 
explains why the EU’s influence prevails over that exerted by legal traditions. Many 
multinational companies also conform their global conduct to EU antitrust law as the 
“most stringent law,” entrenching EU antitrust law as the global de facto norm 
(Bradford 2020). This de facto convergence often also paves the way for de jure 
convergence as countries codify EU-style antitrust laws domestically with the support 
of their export-oriented corporations that already bear the costs of EU compliance and 
prefer uniform rules (Vogel 1997; Bradford 2020).  
EU law also diffuses through its member states. For instance, because Spain 
and Germany had harmonized their laws with EU antitrust law, when Colombia was 
copying Spanish antitrust law or Taiwan was copying German antitrust law 
(correlations of 0.58 and 0.57, respectively), they were effectively copying EU law. This 
mediating influence of EU members thus explains why Colombia and Taiwan have 
antitrust laws that are similar (the correlation is 0.52) despite their different legal origins. 
The same patterns likely exist in other areas where legal diffusion has been 
influenced by EU law or other leading regulatory authorities like the OECD (see, e.g., 
Linos 2013). For example, EU law has become the “gold standard” globally in data 
privacy. Today, over 100 countries have adopted privacy laws, most of them resembling 
the EU law on data protection (Greenleaf 2014; Schwartz and Peifer 2017). These 
countries represent different legal traditions, and align many common law jurisdictions 
with the European civil law jurisdictions—often for the same reasons why they emulate 
EU antitrust laws. The same pattern may hold for other areas where the EU has been 
a regulatory leader, including: food safety, chemical regulations, animal welfare, anti-
discrimination law, and environmental policy (Bradford 2020).  







Our results show that shared legal origins are associated with countries having 
similar property laws, but they are not associated with countries having similar antitrust 
laws. This finding adds to the existing, contested debate on the relationship between 
legal origins and legal substance by empirically showing that this relationship can vary 
from one area of law to another. The results also highlight how other forms of 
influence, including that exercised by supranational legal institutions such as the 
European Union, can override the influence exerted by legal traditions. Given the 
growing lawmaking by supranational institutions, 26  it is also possible that the 
significance of the legal origins will further wane in the coming decades.  
Our results also point to at least two major avenues for future research. First, 
continued research is needed to explore the generalizability of our results. For instance, 
although we have no reason to believe that property is unique among areas of historical 
legal regulation or that antitrust is unique among areas that have only recently been 
regulated, it is possible that our findings are specific to these areas. Additionally, we 
exclusively test the similarity of countries’ law on the books, and we are unable to look 
at the way those laws are applied and enforced. Although this concern is one that 
plagues the entire legal origins literature, future research should find ways to explore 
the relationship between legal origins and laws in action. Moreover, we focus on 
average effects for a cross-section of countries, but it is possible that there are 
heterogenous effects across time or subsets of countries.  
                                               
26 For instance, in addition to the EU, there are at least five other regional organizations that have some 
degree of  supranational competition policy: Andean Community (CAN), East African Community (EAC), 
Economic Community of  West African States (ECOWAS), European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). 





Second, future research should do more to document the mechanisms that 
produced the patterns we found. For instance, our results may simply be driven by 
property law being an old, well-established area of law, while antitrust is a relatively 
new area of law in most jurisdictions. Alternatively, the key explanatory variable may 
be that supranational law-making has done little to influence property law, while the 
EU and ICN have been critical in shaping antitrust laws around the world. Property 
law is also less complex and technical than antitrust law, lending the development of 
antitrust law perhaps more readily to alternative sources of influence. Relatedly, Chang 
and Smith (2019) suggest that, because it is easier to change laws when there are fewer 
ripple effects on other laws, countries’ isolated legal doctrines may be more likely to 
converge with global norms than countries’ legal doctrines that interconnected to many 
other doctrines. It is possible that property laws may be less likely to evolve because 
they are more deeply connected to many other aspects of a country’ legal system. 
Moreover, functional theories of legal convergence suggest countries’ laws are more 
likely to converge in cases where one rule is clearly more efficient, but less likely to 
converge in cases where multiple laws are similarly efficient (Levmore 1987; Dari-
Mattiacci and Guerriero 2019). This points to the need for more research into whether 
evolution in legal regimes is related to the effects of legal differences (e.g. Acemoglu 
and Johnson 2005; Guerriero 2016). Finally, it is possible that laws that are more likely 
to govern cross-border conduct (such as antitrust) are more likely to be subject to 
foreign influences compared to laws that primarily govern legal relationships within 
countries (such as property).  
That said, despite the need for future research, we believe that this article 
provides the most detailed investigation yet conducted into the relationship between 
legal origins and legal substance. And, by doing so, has provided important new 





evidence about one of the most prominent debates on the influence of legal history on 
contemporary economic, political, and social outcomes.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Dyads Mean SD Min Max 
Property Law Correlation 4,095 0.30 0.14 -0.07 0.99 
Antitrust Law Correlation 4,095 0.43 0.13 -0.04 0.85 
      
Shared Legal Origin (LLSV) 4,095 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Shared Legal Origin (KMSW) 4,095 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Shared Colonial Origins (KMSW) 4,095 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Shared Legal Order 4,095 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
      
Distance 4,095 8.56 0.92 4.74 9.88 
Contiguous 4,095 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Common National Language 4,095 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 
Common Ethnic Language 4,095 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
      
Population (ln) – Country1  4,095 2.72 1.52 -0.89 7.20 
Population (ln) – Country2 4,095 2.71 1.55 -0.89 7.20 
NGDP (ln) – Country1 4,095 11.73 1.90 7.62 16.52 
NGDP (ln) – Country2 4,095 11.82 1.90 7.62 16.52 
Notes: Distance is the natural log is the distance (in kilometers) weighted by population. 











Figure 3: Correlations of Legal Substance by Shared Legal Origins 
 
A. Property Laws 
 
 
B. Antitrust Laws 
  
	  





Table 2: Primary Results – Property Law Correlations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin 0.070*** 0.103*** 0.091*** 0.070*** 0.060*** 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) 
Distance (ln)   -0.042*** -0.020*** -0.032*** 
   (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
Contiguous    0.064*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
   (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) 
Common National Language    0.173*** 0.133*** 
    (0.037) (0.029) 
Common Ethnic Language    0.001 -0.016 
    (0.026) (0.020) 
Population (ln) – Country1      -0.003 
     (0.005) 
Population (ln) – Country2     -0.002 
     (0.006) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.003 
     (0.004) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.005 
     (0.005) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.058 0.318 0.372 0.441 0.182 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients of property 
law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad and the 












Table 3: Primary Results – Antitrust Law Correlations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin 0.001 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.009* -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) 
Distance (ln)   -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.045*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Contiguous    -0.004 -0.004 0.005 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) 
Common National Language    0.042*** 0.035 
    (0.014) (0.022) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.018 -0.052** 
    (0.012) (0.021) 
Population (ln) – Country1     -0.001 
     (0.007) 
Population (ln) – Country2     -0.000 
     (0.005) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.001 
     (0.006) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.000 
     (0.005) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.000 0.611 0.633 0.635 0.099 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients of antitrust 
law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad and the 









Figure 4: Coefficient Plots 
A. Property Laws 
 
B. Antitrust Law 
 
Notes: The coefficients for “Legal Origins (LLSV Coding)” are reported in Tables 2 and 
3; the coefficients for “Legal Origins (LMSW Coding)” are reported in Tables A.4 and 
A.5; the coefficients for “Colonial Origins (KMSW Coding)” are reported in Tables 
A.6 and A.7; and the coefficients for “Legal Order” are reported in Tables A.8 and A.9. 













This supplemental appendix provides four pieces of additional information. Part 1 
provides a list of countries included in our sample and their legal origins. Part 2 reports 
results when using an alternative approach to country-fixed effects to control for 
country-level variation in correlations across dyads. Part 3 reports results while using 
three alternative measures of legal origins discussed in Section 4.4 of the paper and 
reported in Figure 4. Part 4 reports the results of four robustness test discussed in 
Section 4.5 of the paper: (A) uses an alternative dependent variable (the percent of 
provisions for which countries have the same coding); (B) breaks-out legal origins by 
category (e.g. the coefficients for English common law and French civil law are 
reported separately); (C) excludes dyads that include EU members; (D) calculates the 
correlations for antitrust law using 36 “core” antitrust variables instead of the full 91 
variables from the dataset.  
 
	  





1. LIST OF COUNTRIES 
 
Table A.1: 91 Countries in Our Dataset and Legal Origin (LLSV Coding) 
Country Origin  Country Origin  Country Origin 
Albania French  Honduras French  Panama French 
Algeria French  Hungary German  Peru French 
Argentina French  India English  Philippines French 
Armenia French  Indonesia French  Poland German 
Australia English  Ireland English  Portugal French 
Austria German  Israel English  Qatar French 
Azerbaijan French  Italy French  Romania French 
Belarus French  Ivory Coast French  Russia French 
Belgium French  Japan German  Serbia French 
Bolivia French  Jordan French  Singapore English 
Brazil French  Kazakhstan French  Slovakia German 
Bulgaria German  Kuwait French  Slovenia German 
Burkina Faso French  Kyrgyzstan French  South Africa English 
Burundi French  Laos French  South Korea German 
Canada English  Latvia German  Spain French 
Chile French  Lithuania French  Sweden Nordic 
China German  Luxembourg French  Switzerland German 
Colombia French  Macedonia French  Syria French 
Costa Rica French  Madagascar French  Taiwan German 
Croatia German  Malaysia English  Tajikistan French 
Czech Republic German  Malta French  Thailand English 
Denmark Nordic  Mauritius French  Tunisia French 
Egypt French  Mexico French  Turkey French 
El Salvador French  Moldova French  Ukraine French 
Estonia German  Mongolia German  United Kingdom English 
Ethiopia French  Netherlands French  United States  English 
Finland Nordic  New Zealand English  Uruguay French 
France French  Nicaragua French  Uzbekistan French 
Germany German  Norway Nordic  Venezuela French 
Greece French  Pakistan English  Vietnam French 









2. “LEAVE OUT” ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
 
Our primary regression specifications include country fixed effects for each of 
the two countries in a given dyad. That said, one concern with this approach is that a 
given country can be country j in some dyads and country t in some dyads. The result 
is that the fixed effect for a given country may be different for dyads that the country 
is indexed as country j than dyads where the country is indexed as country t.  
To address this concern, as an alternative to fixed effects, for each dyad we 
calculated the “leave-out” mean correlation of property laws for the countries in the 
dyads, and did the same for antitrust laws. For example, for the dyad “Albania-
Vietnam”, we calculated the average property law correlation for all other dyads that 
include Albania (regardless of whether Albania is country j or country t in the dyad), 
and the average property law correlation for all other dyads that include Vietnam 
(regardless of whether Vietnam is country j or country t in the dyad). Importantly, we 
excluded the value from the “Albania-Vietnam” dyad when calculating the averages for 
Albania and Vietnam.  
We then included these measures as two variables in our regression. Tables A.2 
and A.3 report these results. The results are consistent with our primary results.  
 
	  





Table A.2: Leave Out Results – Property Law Correlations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin 0.070*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Distance (ln)   -0.024*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
   (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Contiguous    0.097*** 0.070*** 0.068*** 
   (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Common National Language    0.162*** 0.163*** 
    (0.034) (0.033) 
Common Ethnic Language    0.002 -0.000 
    (0.022) (0.022) 
Population (ln) – Country1      -0.002 
     (0.002) 
Population (ln) – Country2     0.001 
     (0.002) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.002 
     (0.002) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.002 
     (0.002) 
Leave Out – Country 1   0.870*** 0.820*** 0.912*** 0.907*** 
  (0.080) (0.077) (0.069) (0.069) 
Leave Out – Country 2  0.949*** 0.897*** 1.021*** 1.021*** 
  (0.081) (0.081) (0.068) (0.068) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No No No No No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.058 0.239 0.288 0.372 0.374 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients of property 
law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad and the 











Table A.4: Leave Out Results – Antitrust Law Correlations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin 0.001 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.005* 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Distance (ln)   -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.017*** 
   (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Contiguous    0.018* 0.012 0.010 
   (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Common National Language    0.047*** 0.047*** 
    (0.014) (0.014) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.010 -0.010 
    (0.011) (0.011) 
Population (ln) – Country1     0.002 
     (0.001) 
Population (ln) – Country2     0.002 
     (0.001) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     -0.001 
     (0.001) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     -0.000 
     (0.001) 
Leave Out – Country 1   1.036*** 0.996*** 1.008*** 1.009*** 
  (0.030) (0.034) (0.032) (0.033) 
Leave Out – Country 2  0.981*** 0.942*** 0.953*** 0.954*** 
  (0.033) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No No No No No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.583 0.598 0.603 0.604 0.583 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients of antitrust 
law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad and the 











3. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF LEGAL ORIGIN 
 
Table A.4: Legal Origin (KMSW Coding) – Property 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin 0.065*** 0.083*** 0.069*** 0.045*** 0.051*** 
KMSW Coding (0.011) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011) 
Distance (ln)   -0.043*** -0.021*** -0.031*** 
   (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
Contiguous    0.067*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 
   (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Common National Language    0.184*** 0.138*** 
    (0.038) (0.030) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.006 -0.016 
    (0.027) (0.021) 
Population (ln) – Country1     -0.003 
     (0.006) 
Population (ln) – Country2     -0.002 
     (0.007) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.002 
     (0.004) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.004 
     (0.005) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.047 0.294 0.350 0.424 0.171 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients of 
property law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad 
and the second country in the dyad, in parentheses. Constant omitted. *** p<0.01, ** 









Table A.5: Legal Origin (KMSW Coding) – Antitrust 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin 0.013 0.018*** 0.010** 0.007 0.010 
KMSW Coding (0.011) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) 
Distance (ln)   -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.044*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Contiguous    -0.004 -0.004 0.003 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) 
Common National 
Language    0.043*** 0.031 
    (0.014) (0.021) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.019 -0.051** 
    (0.012) (0.021) 
Population (ln) – Country1     -0.002 
     (0.007) 
Population (ln) – Country2     -0.001 
     (0.006) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.002 
     (0.006) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.001 
     (0.005) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.002 0.610 0.632 0.635 0.101 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients of 
antitrust law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the 
dyad and the second country in the dyad, in parentheses. Constant omitted. *** p<0.01, ** 









Table A.6: Colonial Origin (KMSW Coding) – Property 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Colonial History 0.053*** 0.069*** 0.050*** 0.011 0.033*** 
KMSW Coding (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.011) 
Both Not Colonized -0.041** -0.092*** -0.077*** -0.021 -0.046* 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) 
Distance (ln)   -0.044*** -0.021*** -0.033*** 
   (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
Contiguous    0.069*** 0.063*** 0.059*** 
   (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
Common National Language    0.193*** 0.150*** 
    (0.039) (0.031) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.003 -0.025 
    (0.029) (0.022) 
Population (ln) – Country1     -0.000 
     (0.006) 
Population (ln) – Country2     0.001 
     (0.007) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.001 
     (0.004) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.002 
     (0.005) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.024 0.271 0.331 0.412 0.154 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients of property 
law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad and the 









Table A.7: Colonial Origin (KMSW Coding) – Antitrust 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Colonial History 0.023* 0.021*** 0.012** 0.006 0.024** 
KMSW Coding (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) 
Both Not Colonized -0.013 -0.019 -0.012 -0.004 -0.045* 
 (0.023) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.024) 
Distance (ln)   -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.045*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Contiguous    -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) 
Common National Language    0.043*** 0.030 
    (0.014) (0.021) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.019 -0.055*** 
    (0.011) (0.020) 
Population (ln) – Country1     -0.002 
     (0.007) 
Population (ln) – Country2     -0.001 
     (0.005) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.003 
     (0.006) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.002 
     (0.005) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.005 0.611 0.632 0.635 0.106 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients of antitrust 
law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad and the 













Table A.8: Shared Legal Order – Property 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Order 0.146*** 0.153*** 0.120*** 0.077*** 0.085*** 
Colonial History or Colony (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
Distance (ln)   -0.028*** -0.014** -0.026*** 
   (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Contiguous    0.052*** 0.053*** 0.049*** 
   (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Common National Language    0.180*** 0.139*** 
    (0.039) (0.030) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.019 -0.040** 
    (0.026) (0.019) 
Population (ln) – Country1     -0.001 
     (0.006) 
Population (ln) – Country2     0.000 
     (0.007) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.000 
     (0.004) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.002 
     (0.005) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.101 0.348 0.371 0.430 0.172 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients of property 
law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad and the 









Table A.9: Shared Legal Order – Antitrust 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Order 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.015* 0.010 0.003 
Colonial History or Colony (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) 
Distance (ln)   -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.044*** 
   (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) 
Contiguous    -0.006 -0.005 0.004 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) 
Common National Language    0.043*** 0.034 
    (0.014) (0.022) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.021* -0.053** 
    (0.012) (0.021) 
Population (ln) – Country1     -0.001 
     (0.007) 
Population (ln) – Country2     -0.000 
     (0.005) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.001 
     (0.006) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.000 
     (0.005) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.007 0.616 0.633 0.635 0.100 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients of 
antitrust law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad 
and the second country in the dyad, in parentheses. Constant omitted. *** p<0.01, ** 













4. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
  
This section reports the results of the robustness checks from Section 4.5.  
 
A. Alternative Dependent Variables 
Our primary results measure similarity of legal regimes by calculating the 
correlations of the coding of the variables, but there are ways other than correlations 
to measure the similarity of the legal regimes. For instance, Elkins, Ginsburg, and 
Melton (2009) measure the similarity of countries’ constitutions using the percent of 
variables for which two constitutions had the same coding. Following this approach, 
we calculated the percent of the variables for which dyads had the same coding. For 
instance, the Albania–Vietnam dyad had the same coding for 71 of 120 property law 
variables, which means they have agreement on 59.2% of the provisions. Figure A.1 
graphs the relationship between the percentage of agreement and correlation measures. 
Tables A.10 and A.11 report regression results using percentage of agreement as the 
dependent variable. These percentage of agreement measures of similarity are highly 
correlated with our primary measures (the correlation between the two measures is 0.96 
for property and 0.93 for antitrust), and our results are thus also substantially the same 









Figure A.1: Correlations Between Dependent Variables 
 
	  





Table A.10: Alternative Measures – Percentage of Agreement – Property 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin 0.031*** 0.050*** 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
Distance (ln)   -0.022*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Contiguous    0.034*** 0.031*** 0.036*** 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Common National Language    0.082*** 0.068*** 
    (0.018) (0.015) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.002 -0.005 
    (0.013) (0.010) 
Population (ln) – Country1     0.001 
     (0.002) 
Population (ln) – Country2     0.001 
     (0.002) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     -0.001 
     (0.002) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.000 
     (0.002) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.050 0.242 0.305 0.369 0.169 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: percentage of agreement for 
property law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad 












Table A.11: Alternative Measures – Percentage of Agreement – Antitrust 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin 0.005 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.005** 0.003 
 (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Distance (ln)   -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.020*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Contiguous    0.000 0.001 0.002 
   (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
Common National Language    0.020*** 0.019** 
    (0.006) (0.008) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.010* -0.026*** 
    (0.005) (0.008) 
Population (ln) – Country1     -0.002 
     (0.003) 
Population (ln) – Country2     -0.001 
     (0.003) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.000 
     (0.002) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     -0.000 
     (0.002) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.002 0.566 0.586 0.588 0.109 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: percentage of agreement for 
antitrust law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad 
and the second country in the dyad, in parentheses. Constant omitted. *** p<0.01, ** 














B. Categories of Legal Origins  
 
Our primary results aggregate all types of shared legal origins together, but there 
may be heterogenous effects based on the type of legal origin. We explored this 
possibility in two ways. We first re-estimated our results while breaking out shared legal 
origins into the four categories from LLSV: English Common Law, French Civil Law, 
German Civil Law, and Nordic Civil Law. For this analysis, for example, for the 
Germany–Switzerland dyad, the German Civil Law variable equals 1 and the other 
three variables—English Common Law, French Civil Law, and Nordic Civil Law—
equal 0. Tables A.12 and A.13 reports these results.  
For property law, the coefficients are positive for all four types of legal origins 
in all specifications, but the result is not statistically significant in our preferred 
specification for German Civil Law. For antitrust law, the estimates are negative or null 
for English Common Law and French Civil Law, but positive and statistically 
significant for German Civil Law and Nordic Civil Law. This perhaps reflects the fact 
that European antitrust law has become the global model (Bradford et al. 2019a), and 
countries with ties to the German legal system are all likely to have adopted the EU 
model.  
	  





Table A.12: Results by Category of Legal Origin – Property 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin 0.165*** 0.213*** 0.196*** 0.097** 0.089** 
English Common Law (0.037) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.039) 
Shared Legal Origin 0.057*** 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.082*** 0.051*** 
French Civil Law (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) 
Shared Legal Origin 0.156*** 0.049** 0.024 0.026 0.122*** 
German Civil Law (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
Shared Legal Origin 0.209*** 0.242*** 0.149*** 0.147*** 0.094** 
Nordic Civil Law (0.008) (0.020) (0.024) (0.034) (0.039) 
Distance (ln)   -0.042*** -0.021*** -0.031*** 
   (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
Contiguous    0.063*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 
   (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) 
Common National Language    0.166*** 0.131*** 
    (0.038) (0.030) 
Common Ethnic Language    0.002 -0.015 
    (0.026) (0.019) 
Population (ln) – Country1     -0.002 
     (0.005) 
Population (ln) – Country2     -0.001 
     (0.006) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.001 
     (0.004) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.004 
     (0.005) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.082 0.330 0.384 0.444 0.190 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients of 
property law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad 
and the second country in the dyad, in parentheses. Constant omitted. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
 





Table A.13: Results by Category of Legal Origin – Antitrust 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin -0.042** 0.020 0.011 -0.006 -0.023 
English Common Law (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) 
Shared Legal Origin -0.006 0.009 0.007 0.005 -0.007 
French Civil Law (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) 
Shared Legal Origin 0.097*** 0.035*** 0.022* 0.022** 0.058*** 
German Civil Law (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Shared Legal Origin 0.139*** 0.109*** 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.040 
Nordic Civil Law (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.025) 
Distance (ln)   -0.030*** -0.027*** -0.043*** 
   (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Contiguous    -0.006 -0.006 0.001 
   (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) 
Common National Language    0.044*** 0.041* 
    (0.015) (0.022) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.017 -0.049** 
    (0.012) (0.021) 
Population (ln) – Country1     0.000 
     (0.007) 
Population (ln) – Country2     0.001 
     (0.005) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.000 
     (0.006) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     -0.001 
     (0.005) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.022 0.612 0.633 0.636 0.107 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients of antitrust 
law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad and the 









Next, it is also possible that countries with certain legal traditions may have 
more similar substantive laws, even if those legal traditions are not the same. We thus 
calculated the average correlations for all 10 possible combinations of legal origins 
using the LLSV data. Figure A.2 reports these results.  
For property law, the correlations were higher for the four combinations of 
shared legal origins (e.g. “English Common Law – English Common Law” or “French 
Civil Law – French Civil Law”) than for any of the other six possible combinations 
that do not involve having shared legal origins (e.g. “English Common Law – French 
Civil Law” or “French Civil Law – Nordic Civil Law”).27 In addition, the correlations 
were higher for the three combinations of related legal origins (e.g. “French Civil Law 
– German Civil Law”) than for three combinations of unrelated legal origins (e.g. 
“English Common Law – French Civil Law”).28  
For antitrust law, dyads that share German Civil law and Nordic Civil Law legal 
origins had the highest average correlations,29 but the other eight combinations of 
dyads had similar results. In other words, dyads that shared English Common Law legal 
origins had roughly the same correlations of their antitrust law as dyads where one 
country had English Common Law legal origins and the other country had, for instance, 
French Civil Law legal origins.30       
                                               
27 P-value under Wilcoxon rank-sum test on whether the two groups are from populations with the same 
distribution is <0.001. 
28 P-value under Wilcoxon rank-sum test on whether the two groups are from populations with the same 
distribution is <0.001. The related group has, on average, higher correlation coefficient than the unrelated 
group, as this result is driven by the difference between the “French Civil Law – German Civil Law” 
combination (coefficient=0.31) and the “English Common Law – French Civil Law” combination 
(coefficient=0.23). 
29 P-value under Wilcoxon rank-sum test on whether the two groups (“German Civil Law – German Civil 
Law” and “Nordic Civil Law – Nordic Civil Law” versus other eight combinations) are from populations 
with the same distribution is <0.001. 
30 P-value under Wilcoxon rank-sum test on whether the two groups (“English Common Law – English 
Common Law” versus the three unrelated combinations that include English Common Law) are from 
populations with the same distribution is 0.386. 





Figure A.2: Average Correlation Coefficients for All Legal Origin Combinations 
A. Property Laws 
 
B. Antitrust Laws 
 
Notes: Figure A.2 plots the average correlation coefficients for each of the 10 possible 
combinations of legal origins for pairs of countries. For example, “Common – Common” 
means that both countries in a dyad have English Common Law Legal Origins, and 
“French – German” means that one country in the dyad has French Civil Law legal origins 
and one country has German Civil Law legal origins.  





C. Excluding Dyads That Include EU Members 
 
It is possible that our results are driven in part by the fact that countries in 
Europe adopt antitrust laws that are more consistent with the EU than with their legal 
origins. If true, this would damper the relationship between shared legal origins and 
antitrust laws. (Although EU membership is unlikely to be driving our property results, 
we estimate these results for both property and antitrust to ensure any differences in 
our results are not attributable to different samples.) To test this possibility, we re-
estimated our primary specifications while excluding dyads that include any of the 28 
EU members. Even when reducing the sample in this way, the results are similar: the 
coefficients for property law remain larger and achieve statistical significance. Tables 
A.14 and A.15 reports these results. In addition to excluding 28 EU members, we also 
ran similar regressions that re-estimated our primary specifications while excluding 
dyads that include any of the following 36 European countries: Albania, Austria, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macedonia, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Ukraine, and the United 









Table A.14: Excluding Dyads with EU Members – Property 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin 0.073*** 0.118*** 0.098*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) (0.018) 
Distance (ln)   -0.060*** -0.029*** -0.041*** 
   (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) 
Contiguous    0.077** 0.092*** 0.079*** 
   (0.031) (0.026) (0.026) 
Common National Language    0.151*** 0.130*** 
    (0.039) (0.029) 
Common Ethnic Language    0.007 -0.019 
    (0.030) (0.024) 
Population (ln) – Country1     -0.003 
     (0.006) 
Population (ln) – Country2     -0.005 
     (0.007) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.005 
     (0.005) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.010* 
     (0.006) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 
R-squared 0.058 0.292 0.396 0.456 0.222 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients for property 
law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad and the 











Table A.15: Excluding Dyads with EU Members – Antitrust 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin 0.015 0.020*** 0.014** 0.005 0.017 
 (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) 
Distance (ln)   -0.022*** -0.015** -0.034*** 
   (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
Contiguous    0.001 0.006 0.009 
   (0.015) (0.014) (0.022) 
Common National Language    0.052*** 0.043* 
    (0.015) (0.023) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.011 -0.053*** 
    (0.012) (0.019) 
Population (ln) – Country1     0.000 
     (0.009) 
Population (ln) – Country2     0.001 
     (0.007) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.006 
     (0.007) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.004 
     (0.006) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 
R-squared 0.003 0.611 0.624 0.630 0.051 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients for 
antitrust law. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered on both the first country in the dyad 
and the second country in the dyad, in parentheses. Constant omitted. *** p<0.01, ** 









D. Calculating Correlations Using 36 “Core” Antitrust Variables 
 
For consistency with our property data, we used all 91 substantive variables in 
our antitrust data when measuring the similarity of countries antitrust regimes. 
However, prior scholarship using this data has identified 36 of the antitrust variables 
as being the most substantively important. We thus re-estimated our results using these 
36 “core” variables to measure antitrust laws. Table A.16 reports these regression 









Table A.16: Calculating Correlation Using 36 Core Variables – Antitrust 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Shared Legal Origin 0.012 0.035*** 0.023** 0.018** 0.015 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Distance (ln)   -0.054*** -0.049*** -0.068*** 
   (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Contiguous    -0.012 -0.014 -0.006 
   (0.020) (0.020) (0.024) 
Common National Language    0.046** 0.028 
    (0.022) (0.025) 
Common Ethnic Language    -0.005 -0.047* 
    (0.021) (0.025) 
Population (ln) – Country1     -0.004 
     (0.007) 
Population (ln) – Country2     -0.004 
     (0.005) 
nGDP (ln) – Country1     0.006 
     (0.005) 
nGDP (ln) – Country2     0.005 
     (0.004) 
      
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 4,095 
R-squared 0.001 0.362 0.398 0.400 0.126 
Notes: All Models report OLS results. Dependent variable: correlation coefficients for 
antitrust law calculating using 36 “core” variables. Robust standard errors, two-way clustered 
on both the first country in the dyad and the second country in the dyad, in parentheses. 
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